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Abstract
We consider a war of attrition in which the winner is determined according to the
unobservable state of nature on a stochastic deadline and players can acquire infor-
mation about the state at any time during the game. We study how the players’
incentive to acquire information interacts with the verifiability of the acquired infor-
mation. When the information is verifiable, players only have an incentive to free ride
on the opponent’s information acquisition and, thus, there is excessive delay. When
the information is unverifiable, an informed player obtains information rents. This
provides an incentive for players to acquire information more quickly, thereby reduc-
ing delay. However, an uninformed player catches up on information acquisition so
as not to be exploited by the informed player, which creates redundant duplication in
information acquisition. We show that in the most natural class of equilibria the two
effects cancel each other out and, thus, the players’ payoffs are identical, regardless
of whether information is verifiable. We also show that, in our model, the faster the
deadline arrives, the longer the conflict lasts.
JEL Classification Numbers: C78, D82, D83.
Keywords : Information Acquisition; War of Attrition; Information Rent; Free
Riding.
1 Introduction
In many economic problems, information has to be acquired, rather than exogenously given,
as typically assumed in the literature. In addition, it has been shown that costly information
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acquisition may have a significant impact on the economic outcome in a variety of situations.
Examples include auctions (Matthews, 1984; Persico, 2000; and Dang, 2007), bargaining
(Shavell, 1994; and Dang, 2008), committee design (Li, 2001; and Persico, 2004), principal-
agent models (Cre´mer and Khalil, 1992; and Cre´mer, Khalil, and Rochet, 1998a, 1998b),
reputation games (Ely and Va¨lima¨ki, 2003; and Liu, 2010), and strategic experimentation
(Bolton and Harris, 1999; and Keller, Rady, and Cripps, 2006).
When information has to be acquired, a key question is whether it can be acquired
efficiently. There are two fundamental non-cooperative incentives concerning information
acquisition. First, information reduces uncertainty for everyone and, therefore, has a public-
good property. Players have an incentive to free ride on others’ information acquisition (the
free-riding incentive). This incentive leads to underinvestment in information acquisition.
Second, if acquired information remains private, then an informed player collects information
rents. The incentive to obtain information rents (the information-rent incentive) leads to
overinvestment in information acquisition. In most existing studies, only one of these two
incentives is operative. For example, the committee-design literature and the strategic-
experimentation literature exclusively focus on the free-riding problem. In bargaining and
auctions, the focus typically shifts to issues related to information rents. The purpose of this
paper is to demonstrate how the two fundamental non-cooperative incentives interact with
each other when they are both present.
The context is a war of attrition with a deadline. In the standard war of attrition, the
game ends only when at least one of the players concedes. In ours, the game exogenously
terminates on a (random or deterministic) deadline, with the termination payoffs depending
on the unobservable state of nature.1 When deciding whether to continue (before the arrival
of the deadline), players have an incentive to learn about the state of nature: the opportunity
cost of concession is larger to a player who is favored by the state and, thus, acquiring
information allows a player to avoid regrettable concession (when the state is favorable) as
well as unnecessary delay (when the state is unfavorable).
To focus more on economic forces, we consider the simplest form of information acquisi-
tion: a player observes the state if he incurs a positive cost. In addition, we concentrate on
the case where both the deadline and information acquisition are most relevant: the deadline
does not arrive too slowly, so that in the absence of information acquisition the conflict is
resolved only by the arrival of the deadline, and information acquisition is not too costly, so
1In the literature on deadline effects, the deadline is often assumed to be the moment at which the
potential surplus dissipates or depreciates (see, e.g., Spier (1992), Fershtman and Seidmann (1993), Ma and
Manove (1993), and Ponsati (1995)). In our model, the deadline is the moment at which the winner of the
game is determined according to the unobservable state. Since the deadline essentially reveals the state, we
will also refer to the deadline as the “public signal.”
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that players have a non-trivial incentive to acquire information.
We study and compare two versions of the model.2 The two cases differ with respect to
whether the acquired information is verifiable. The two non-cooperative incentives regarding
information acquisition are manifested differently in the two cases. When information is
verifiable, as in the disclosure game,3 private information is unraveled: it is strictly dominant
for an informed player to reveal favorable information and, thus, if an informed player does
not disclose his private information, the opponent can infer that the state is favorable to him.
Consequently, acquired information is essentially public and only the free-riding incentive
is operative. When information is not verifiable, unraveling does not necessarily occur and
an informed player obtains positive information rents. In other words, the weak type (who
knows that the state is unfavorable to him) can always mimic the strong type and, thus, an
informed player must be compensated in order to reveal his type.
In each case, there are many equilibria, as in the standard war of attrition and essentially
for the same reason: players are indifferent between acquiring information and waiting at
any point in time, including the beginning of the game. We fully characterize the set of all
equilibria but mainly focus on the most natural class of equilibria in which no player acquires
information with a positive probability at the beginning of the game.4
We show that the game ends faster when information is unverifiable, but the players’
expected payoffs are identical in the two cases. As explained before, when information is
verifiable, only the free-riding incentive is operative, which causes excessive delay in in-
formation acquisition. When information is not verifiable, the free-riding incentive is still
operative, but is (partially) offset by the information-rent incentive. This translates into less
delay with unverifiable information.
When information is unverifiable, however, there is another source of inefficiency: dupli-
cation in information acquisition. When an informed player attempts to extract information
rents, an uninformed player can respond by acquiring information himself, that is, he can
catch up on acquiring information to protect himself from being exploited. Such duplication
never occurs with verifiable information but does occur with unverifiable information. It
turns out that the positive effect from less delay exactly cancels out the negative effect from
duplication. As a result, the verifiability of the acquired information significantly affects
equilibrium behavior but not the players’ payoffs.
We caution that the payoff equivalence does not hold if all equilibria are considered.
The most efficient equilibrium in each case is the one in which one player, say player 1,
2A player’s action of acquiring information is observable by the opponent. We discuss this assumption in
Section 8.
3See Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) for seminal contributions.
4See Section 6 for several reasons why such equilibria are more appealing than others.
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acquires information for sure at the beginning of the game. Player 1’s expected payoff is
the same as in the equilibrium in which no player acquires information at the beginning,
but player 2’s expected payoff is maximized among all the equilibria. Comparing the two
cases, player 2’s expected payoff is strictly higher when information is verifiable. This is
because there is no delay in the most efficient equilibria (no free-riding effect), while the
information-rent problem that is present only when information is unverifiable still causes
excessive information acquisition.
Although our analysis is mainly theoretically motivated, our model fits into several appli-
cations. Many economic problems can be represented by wars of attrition, such as litigation
(Ordover and Rubinstein, 1986), oligopolistic competition with the option to exit (Fuden-
berg and Tirole, 1986; Ghemawat and Nalebuff, 1985; and Kreps and Wilson, 1982), patent
races (Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz, and Tirole, 1983), and public-good provision (Bliss and
Nalebuff, 1984; and Bulow and Klemperer, 1999). The conflicts are often resolved by an
exogenous force. In a legal conflict, the trial eventually determines whether the defendant is
guilty. In a competition over a technology standard, the government may intervene or public
signals that prove clear superiority of one technology over the other may arrive. Our model
captures in a simple way the problems facing agents in such situations.
Our analysis provides novel insights for such applications. Our main result suggests
that whether the government (or society) should require agents involved in a conflict to
disclose their information or provide a verification service for their information depends on
the objective of the government (or society). If the objective is to maximize the agents’ joint
surplus, as in civil charges, a mandatory disclosure rule or a verification service would not
help. If the objective is, in addition, to have the right agent win, as in criminal charges
or technology standard competitions, then a mandatory disclosure rule and a verification
service are marginally useful.5 If the objective also includes ending the conflict as quickly as
possible, as in the public-good-provision problem, then a mandatory disclosure rule should
not be imposed and a verification service should not be provided.
Our model can also be used to address other policy issues in such applications. For
example, in a legal conflict, the government may regulate attorney fees or impose a stricter
deadline. In a technology standard competition, the government may intervene to control
the costs of the participants or invest in research to evaluate the merits of each technology.
Our results provide simple answers to these questions.
One particularly interesting result is that the shorter the deadline is, the longer the
conflict lasts (regardless of whether the information is verifiable). Increasing the arrival rate
of the deadline/public signals directly speeds up the resolution of a conflict. However, in our
5With unverifiable information, a wrong winner may be selected, but the probability is negligible.
4
model, where players can acquire information about the state, such a rate increase has the
indirect effect of crowding out the players’ incentive to acquire information. The players’
incentive to free-ride on information acquisition comes from the possibility that the public
signal may arrive soon or that the opponent may acquire information first, both of which
help them avoid the information-acquisition costs. Therefore, as the arrival rate of public
signals increases, players are less willing to acquire information. In our model, this indirect
effect is at least twice as large as the direct effect6 and, thus, shortening deadlines delays the
resolution of a conflict.
Related Literature
The literature on the war of attrition and its applications is too large to summarize here.
Let us introduce only a few seminal contributions. The game is first proposed by Maynard
Smith (1974). The analysis of the game with complete information is generalized by Bishop
and Cannings (1978) and, subsequently, by Hendricks, Weiss, and Wilson (1988). Various
versions of the game with incomplete information are also studied (for example, Bishop,
Cannings, Maynard Smith (1978), Riley (1980), Milgrom and Weber (1985), Nalebuff and
Riley (1985), and Ponsati and Sa´kovics (1995)). Bulow and Klemperer (1999) generalize the
game into the case with N+k players and N winners. Our model is unique in that the game
begins with complete information but turns into a game with incomplete information once
a player acquires information, that is, asymmetric information is endogenized.
The closest papers to ours are those by Ordover and Rubinstein (1986) and Morath
(2010). Ordover and Rubinstein (1986) study a war of attrition between an informed player
and an uninformed player. As in our paper, the information of the informed player is about
who wins at the (deterministic) deadline. The crucial difference is that, in our model,
the information is endogenous and both players can learn about the state at any point
in time, while in Ordover and Rubinstein (1986), the information is exogenous and the
uninformed player does not have the ability to acquire information. Our analysis reveals that
both the endogeneity of information and the uninformed player’s access to the information-
acquisition technology have significant effects on the equilibrium outcome. Morath (2010)
studies the model in which players can acquire information about the cost of fighting at (and
only at) the beginning of the game. He is mainly interested in the strategic value of (not)
acquiring information and, therefore, considers the case where the players’ values of losing
6From an individual player’s viewpoint, the arrival of the public signal and the opponent’s information
acquisition are perfect substitutes. Therefore, for both players to remain indifferent after the increase in the
arrival rate, each player’s concession rate must decrease by at least as much as the increase in the arrival
rate. See Section 7 for more-detailed arguments.
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are independent and information acquisition is costless.
A few papers study the situations in which the free-riding and information-rent incentives
interact. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) study the competitive market in which investors can
acquire information about the return of a risky asset. Investors, if they become informed, can
receive arbitrage profits (information rents). However, the uninformed players can infer about
the information of the informed investors through competitive prices and, thus, investors also
have a free-riding incentive. They show that this conflict between the two incentives leads to
competitive prices only partially reflecting the information of the informed investors. Jansen
(2008) considers the oligopoly setting in which firms may acquire information about the
demand curve. If firms must disclose their acquired information, then, due to the free-riding
incentive, too little information is acquired. If firms cannot credibly disclose their acquired
information, then, due to the information-rent incentive, too much information is acquired.
If firms can choose whether or not to disclose, then, due to the conflict between the two
incentives, firms’ expected payoffs may be higher (and lower) than under no disclosure or
full disclosure.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and analyzes the
benchmark model in which information acquisition is not allowed. Section 3 presents the
model with information acquisition. Section 4 and Section 5 analyze the case where acquired
information is verifiable and the case where it is not, respectively. Section 6 highlights the role
of the verifiability of the information by comparing the two models. Section 7 demonstrates
that shortening the deadline delays the resolution of a conflict. Section 8 concludes by
discussing two particularly interesting extensions.
2 War of Attrition with Deadlines
2.1 Setup
Our underlying model is the standard war of attrition. There are two players, player 1
and player 2. Each player chooses the time to concede, ti ∈ R+. If player j concedes first
(tj < ti), then player i receives utility e
−rtjh, while player j receives utility e−rtj l, where
h > l > 0. In other words, at time min{t1, t2}, the loser (who conceded) receives l and the
winner receives h, and the common discount rate is r > 0. For simplicity, we assume that
if ti = tj, both players obtain e
−rtil.7 Let d denote the undiscounted reward to the winner,
that is, d ≡ h− l.
7This is without loss of generality, as the event that both players concede simultaneously occurs with
probability 0 in all of the cases we consider.
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Unlike the standard game, our game can also terminate exogenously. More specifically,
there is an underlying state of nature, ω ∈ {1, 2}. The state ω is initially unknown, but
a public signal that reveals the state arrives according to a Poisson rate λ > 0. Upon the
arrival of the signal, the game ends and player i receives utility h (l) if ω = i (j). It is
commonly known that ω = 1 with probability p1 ∈ [0.5, 1) and ω = 2 with probability
p2 = 1− p1.
Within each time interval [t, t+ dt), the timing of the game is as follows: a public signal
arrives with probability 1− e−λdt. If it arrives, then the game ends according to the revealed
state. If not, the players simultaneously decide whether or not to concede. Although we
study a continuous-time model, the model can be interpreted as the limit of the discrete-time
models in which players move only at t = ∆, 2∆, .... We use this discrete-time version to
clarify some of our results.
2.2 Characterization
Let a distribution function Gi : R+ → [0, 1] represent player i’s concession strategy, where
Gi(t) is the cumulative probability that player i concedes by time t. By standard argument,
Gi has no atom in its interior. In addition, unless the equilibrium is degenerate (a player
concedes at the beginning of the game), the supports of equilibrium G1 and G2 are common
and take an interval starting from time 0. Let gi denote the density of Gi over the interior
of its support.
As in the standard war of attrition, at each t in the interior of the support, players must
be indifferent between conceding and waiting an instant more. Therefore, for each i = 1, 2
and j 6= i,
rl =
gj(t)
1−Gj(t)d+ λpid.
The left-hand side is player i’s marginal cost of waiting an instant more, while the right-hand
side is the corresponding marginal benefit.8 Player i receives l if he concedes. His marginal
8The analogous indifference condition in the discrete-time model is
l =
Gj(t)−Gj(t−∆)
1−Gj(t−∆) h+
1−Gj(t)
1−Gj(t−∆)e
−r∆ ((1− e−λ∆)(l + pid) + e−λ∆l) .
The left-hand side is player i’s payoff by conceding, while the right-hand side is his payoff by waiting one
more period. If player i does not concede, then player j concedes with probability Gj(t)−Gj(t−∆)1−Gj(t−∆) in this
period. With the complementary probability, the game moves to the next period. In the next period, a
public signal arrives with probability 1 − e−λ∆, in which case player i receives h with probability pi and l
with probability 1−pi. If a signal does not arrive, for a small enough ∆, player i is again indifferent between
conceding and waiting one more period and, thus, player i’s expected payoff is l. It is straightforward to
show that this discrete-time condition converges to the continuous-time condition as ∆ tends to zero.
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cost of staying an instant more is the discounting cost of collecting the payoff an instant
later. If player i wait an instant more, he obtains an additional payoff d under the following
two contingencies: (1) player j concedes before t + dt, whose arrival rate is
gj(t)
1−Gj(t) ; (2) a
public signal arrives and the state is revealed to be favorable to player i (that is, ω = i).
The arrival rate of the signal is λ and the probability that ω = i is pi.
If rl < λpid, then the marginal benefit is always larger than the marginal cost. Therefore,
player i never concedes. If rl ≥ λpid, then the indifference condition has a closed-form
solution:
Gj(t) = 1− (1−Gj(0)) exp
(
−
(
rl − λpid
d
)
t
)
,
where Gj(0) ∈ [0, 1] is unknown.
There are essentially three cases to consider. If rl < λp2d, then no player is willing to
concede. In this case, it is the unique equilibrium that both players wait for a public signal
forever. If λp2d < rl < λp1d, then player 1 never concedes and, given player 1’s strategy,
player 2 strictly prefers conceding immediately. It is the unique equilibrium that player 2
concedes immediately.
If rl > λp1d, then both G1 and G2 are well-defined. One restriction for the two unknowns,
G1(0) and G2(0), is that at least one of them must be equal to 0. This is because if player
i concedes with a positive probability at time 0, then player j strictly prefers waiting an
instant more to conceding immediately. There is no further restriction on G1(0) and G2(0)
and, therefore, Gi(0) can take any value in [0, 1] as long as Gj(0) = 0.
In the third parameter case, where rl > λp1d, as is familiar in the war-of-attrition litera-
ture, there are also degenerate equilibria: one player does not concede forever or until after
a sufficiently long time, and the opponent concedes immediately. Such equilibria are essen-
tially irrelevant, because their equilibrium outcomes coincide with those in which Gi(0) = 1
for some i. For clarity of exposition, we ignore all such degenerate equilibria throughout the
paper.
The following proposition summarizes the findings for the model without information
acquisition.
Proposition 1 (i) If rl < λp2d, then there is a unique equilibrium in which both players
wait for a public signal forever. Player i’s expected payoff is λ
r+λ
(l + pid).
(ii) If λp2d < rl ≤ λp1d, then it is the unique equilibrium outcome that player 2 concedes
immediately. Player 2 obtains l, while player 1 obtains h.9
9If λp2d = rl ≤ λp1d, then there is a continuum of equilibria. If rl < λp1d, then for any α ∈ [0, 1], it is an
equilibrium that player 2 concedes with probability α at date 0 and never concedes with the complementary
probability, and player 1 never concedes. Player 2’s expected payoff is always l = λr+λ (l+ p2d), while player
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(iii) If rl > λp1d, there is a continuum of equilibria. For any G1(0), G2(0) ∈ [0, 1] such
that G1(0)G2(0) = 0, it is an equilibrium that player i concedes according to distribution
function Gi(t) = 1 − (1−Gi(0)) exp
(
−
(
rl−λpjd
d
)
t
)
for both i = 1, 2. Each player can
obtain any expected payoff in [l, h], provided that the opponent receives l.
Intuitively, if a public signal arrives sufficiently fast (λ is high), players are sufficiently
patient (r is small), or the winning reward is sufficiently large (d is large), as in Case (i),
players are unwilling to concede and, therefore, wait forever. In the opposite case, as in Case
(iii), public signals are essentially irrelevant and, thus, the game is almost identical to the
standard war of attrition. In the asymmetric case (p1 > p2), there is an intermediate case
(Case (ii)): a public signal arrives fast enough, so that player 1 is willing to wait, but not
too fast, so that player 2 does not want to bear delay costs. In that case, player 2 concedes
immediately and player 1 obtains the highest possible payoff.
3 The Model with Information Acquisition
The players have an incentive to learn about the state ω in order to avoid regrettable conces-
sions and unnecessary delay. In this section, we allow players to acquire information about
ω. Information acquisition is costly: each player must incur a cost c > 0 in order to observe
the state ω.
Within each time interval [t, t+ dt), the timing of the game is as follows:
1. Signal stage: a public signal arrives with probability 1 − e−λdt. If it arrives, then the
game terminates according to the state.
2. Information-acquisition stage: Players simultaneously decide whether or not to acquire
information. Players observe whether the opponent has acquired information.
3. Disclosure stage: If acquired information is verifiable, then the player who acquired
information can disclose his information. Otherwise, this stage is skipped.
4. Concession stage: Players simultaneously decide whether or not to concede.
We focus on the case where both deadline and information acquisition are most relevant.
Formally, we make use of the following two assumptions.
Assumption 1
λpid > rl, i = 1, 2.
1 can obtain any utility between [l, h]. If rl = λp1d, the roles of the players can be switched and, thus, both
players can obtain any expected payoff in [l, h], provided that the opponent obtains l.
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This assumption states that a public signal arrives fast enough (λ is high), the reward of
winning is large enough (d is large), or the players are patient enough (r is small), so that
both players are unwilling to forgo the opportunity to win the game. Under this assumption,
if no player acquires information, by Proposition 1 (Case (i)), both players wait forever and
the game ends only upon the arrival of a public signal.
Assumption 2
c <
rl
λ
.
To understand this assumption, suppose that no player would acquire information and both
players would wait forever. If a player believes that the state is favorable to him with
probability p, then his expected payoff is λ
r+λ
(l + pd). Now suppose the player acquires
information and the game terminates according to the true state. In this case, the player’s
expected payoff is −c+ l+ pd. The assumption states that the latter payoff is strictly larger
than the former, as long as the player does not strictly prefer conceding immediately to
acquiring information, that is, −c+ l+ pd > λ
r+λ
(l+ pd) for any p such that −c+ l+ pd ≥ l.
Intuitively, this assumption guarantees that the cost of information acquisition is not too
large, so players have a non-trivial incentive to acquire information.
For notational simplicity, we will refer to a player who has acquired information and
found that the state is favorable (unfavorable) to him as the “strong” (“weak”) type.
4 Information Acquisition with Verifiable Information
This section considers the case where players can verify acquired information.
We begin with three immediate results. First, the game ends immediately once at least
one player acquires information. This is because it is a dominant strategy for the strong type
to disclose the acquired information. If an informed player does not disclose the information,
then the opponent would know that the state is favorable to him and, therefore, would never
concede. The weak informed player would then immediately concede. Second, the game
endogenously concludes only when at least one player acquires information. This is because,
by Assumption 1, if no player acquires information, then both players would wait forever.
Third, if player j never acquires information, then player i acquires information immediately.
This is because, by Assumptions 1 and 2, player i’s expected payoff by acquiring information
−c+ l + pid is strictly larger than his expected payoff by waiting forever λr+λ(l + pid).
The above results imply that the only strategic problem is who acquires the information.
Since the information is verifiable, information unraveling prevents players from extracting
any information rents. Therefore, only the free-riding incentive is present and the game is
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essentially a war of attrition. The difference from the standard war of attrition is that now
it is not about who concedes first, but who acquires the information first.
For a formal description of the equilibrium, let a distribution function Fi : R+ → [0, 1]
represent player i’s information-acquisition strategy, where Fi(t) is the cumulative probability
that player i acquires information by time t. By standard argument, Fi has no atom in its
interior. Let fi denote the density of Fi over the interior of its support. As familiar, if t is in
the interior of the support of Fi, player i must be indifferent between acquiring information
and waiting an instant more. Therefore,
r (−c+ l + pid) =
(
λ+
fj(t)
1− Fj(t)
)
c. (1)
The left-hand side is player i’s marginal cost of delaying information acquisition an instant,
while the right-hand side is the corresponding marginal benefit.10 The marginal cost is his
discounting cost of collecting the payoff by acquiring information, −c + l + pid, an instant
later. The marginal benefit comes from the fact that during that instant, a public signal
may arrive, at an arrival rate of λ, or the opponent may acquire information, at an arrival
rate of
fj(t)
1−Fj(t) . Under both contingencies, player i avoids the information-acquisition cost c.
Solving the first-order ordinary differential equation,
Fj(t) = 1− (1− Fj(0)) exp
(
−
(
r
−c+ l + pid
c
− λ
)
t
)
,
where Fj ∈ [0, 1] is unknown. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the function is always well-
defined. One restriction for the two unknowns F1(0) and F2(0) is that at least one of them
must be equal to zero, that is, F1(0)F2(0) = 0. Similarly to the standard argument, this is
because if a player acquires information with a positive probability at date 0, then the other
player strictly prefers waiting an instant. As in Section 2, there is no further restriction
for the two unknowns. Therefore, F1(0) and F2(0) can take any values in [0, 1] as long as
F1(0)F2(0) = 0.
The following proposition summarizes the findings. Given the characterization above,
the proof is straightforward and thus omitted.
Proposition 2 When acquired information is verifiable, there is a continuum of equilib-
ria: for each F1(0), F2(0) ∈ [0, 1] such that F1(0)F2(0) = 0, there is an equilibrium in
10The discrete-time analog to this equation is
−c+ l+ pid = Fj(t)− Fj(t−∆)1− Fj(t−∆) (l+ pid) +
1− Fj(t)
1− Fj(t−∆)e
−r∆ ((1− e−λ∆)(l + pid) + e−λ∆(−c+ l + pid)) .
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which player i acquires information according to the distribution function Fi(t) = 1 − (1 −
Fi(0)) exp
(
−
(
r
−c+l+pjd
c
− λ
)
t
)
for both i = 1, 2. The set of the players’ expected payoffs is
given by
{(v1, v2) : vi ∈ [−c+ l + pid, l + pid], and (v1 − (−c+ l + p1d))(v2 − (−c+ l + p2d)) = 0} ,
that is, player i can achieve any payoff in [−c + l + pid, l + pid] as long as the opponent
receives −c+ l + pjd.
5 Information Acquisition with Unverifiable Informa-
tion
This section studies the case where acquired information is not verifiable. The difference
from the previous section is that there is no disclosure stage (or the disclosed information is
not credible).
We first characterize the outcome of a game in which one player is informed about
the state and the other is not. This is the subgame immediately following one player’s
information acquisition. We use the outcome of this game to characterize the equilibrium in
the original game.
5.1 Subgame in which one player is informed
This game is similar to that of Ordover and Rubinstein (1986). The difference lies in the
uninformed player’s strategy set. In Ordover and Rubinstein (1986), the uninformed player
can choose only whether or not to concede, while in our game the uninformed player can
acquire information. We show that this difference makes the equilibrium dynamics of our
game significantly different from those of Ordover and Rubinstein (1986).
For expositional clarity, consider the discrete-time version of the model. We begin with
two results concerning the equilibrium behavior of the weak informed player in the first period
of the subgame. First, the weak informed player must concede with a positive probability.
Otherwise, the uninformed player would either acquire information or wait for a public
signal, and then, due to discounting, the weak informed player would get strictly less than l.
Second, the weak informed player does not concede with probability 1. If he concedes with
probability 1, then in the next period the uninformed player would believe that he is facing
a strong type with probability 1 and, therefore, concedes without acquiring information for
sure. But the weak informed player would then strictly prefer waiting to conceding in the
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first period, which is a contradiction.
The fact that the weak informed player stays with a positive probability but still ob-
tains l implies the following two results regarding the uninformed player’s behavior in the
second period. First, the uninformed player must concede without acquiring information
with a certain probability. Otherwise, the weak informed player would receive only l in the
second period, regardless of whether the uninformed player acquires information or waits
forever. This is a contradiction because he could have received the same payoff in the first
period. Second, the concession probability of the uninformed player must be small enough.
Otherwise, the weak informed player would strictly prefer waiting to conceding in the first
period.
In equilibrium, the weak informed player randomizes between conceding and waiting
in the first period. The uninformed player randomizes between acquiring information and
conceding in the second period. They do so with just enough probabilities so that both the
weak informed player and the uninformed player are indifferent between their two actions.
The game ends for sure in the second period.
Formally, let α be the probability that the weak informed player concedes in the first
period. Also, let β be the probability that the uninformed player acquires information in
the second period. The following two conditions must be satisfied:
1. Weak informed player i’s indifference:
l = e−r∆
(
(1− e−λ∆)l + e−λ∆ (βl + (1− β)h)) .
If the weak informed player does not concede, then in the next period a public signal
arrives with probability 1−e−λ∆, in which case the player receives l. Conditional on the
event that a signal does not arrive, the uninformed player acquires information with
probability β and concedes with the complementary probability. The weak informed
player receives l and h in each event. Solving this equation,
β = 1− (1− e
−r∆)l
e−(r+λ)∆d
.
This value is well-defined as long as ∆ is sufficiently small.
2. Uninformed player j’s indifference:
−c+ l + pj(1− α)
pi + pj(1− α)d = l.
The left-hand side is player j’s expected payoff by acquiring information in the second
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period. Conditional on the event that player i did not concede in the first period, by
Bayes’ rule, player j’s belief over the state is
pj(1−α)
pi+pj(1−α) . The right-hand side is his
payoff by conceding. Solving the equation,
α = 1− pic
pj(d− c) .
This probability is also well-defined because, by Assumptions 1 and 2,
c <
r
λ+ r
(l + pjd) <
r
λ+ r
(
λpjd
r
+ pjd
)
= pjd.
Probability α is independent of ∆, while β approaches one as ∆ tends to zero. Therefore,
in the equilibrium of the continuous-time model, the weak informed player immediately
concedes with probability α. If the informed player does not concede, then an instant later
the uninformed player acquires information with probability 1. One may wonder why the
weak informed player does not prefer conceding immediately to waiting, given that the
uninformed player acquires information with probability 1 in the next period and, thus,
the weak informed player cannot obtain more than l even if he waits. This is because
in continuous time the cost of waiting an instant is negligible. In compensating the weak
informed player’s cost of waiting an instant, it is enough for the uninformed player to concede
with negligible probability. In turn, this is why the uninformed player must remain indifferent
between acquiring information and conceding, even if in equilibrium he acquires information
with probability 1.
Proposition 3 (Subgame outcome) In the subgame in which only player i is informed about
the state, there is a unique equilibrium. In equilibrium, weak player i concedes with probability
pjd−c
pj(d−c) . If informed player i does not concede, then uninformed player j acquires information
and terminates the game. Strong (weak) player i obtains h (l). Player j’s expected payoff is
l +
pjd−c
d−c d.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Let us quantify the amount of information rents and the value of the uninformed player’s
information-acquisition opportunity.
Information rents If player i is informed but his opponent is not, then his expected
payoff is l + pid. If the opponent is informed but player i is not, then his expected payoff
is l+ pid−c
d−c d. Therefore, the additional payoff player i collects by acquiring information first
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amounts to
(l + pid)−
(
l +
pid− c
d− c d
)
=
(1− pi)cd
d− c . (2)
The value of the opportunity to acquire information Suppose the uninformed player
cannot acquire information. The game is then essentially the stochastic deadline version of
Ordover and Rubinstein (1986). In this game, the weak informed player concedes with a
positive probability in the first period. From the second period on, he strictly prefers waiting
to conceding and, therefore, never concedes. The uninformed player strictly prefers waiting
to conceding in the first period and is indifferent between conceding and waiting from the
second period forward. Therefore, in equilibrium, the weak informed player concedes only
in the first period, while the uninformed player gradually concedes starting from the second
period.
Let α be the probability that weak informed player i concedes in the first period. Also, let
a distribution function Gj : R+ → [0, 1] represent uninformed player j’s concession strategy.
Then the following two conditions must be satisfied:
1. Uninformed player j’s indifference: Uninformed player j is indifferent between conced-
ing and waiting at each point in time, except at the beginning of the game. Therefore,
rl = λ
pj(1− α)
pi + pj(1− α)d.
The left-hand side is uninformed player j’s marginal cost of waiting an instant, while
the right-hand side is the corresponding marginal benefit. The latter only comes from
the possibility of the arrival of a public signal, because informed player i never concedes,
regardless of whether he is strong or weak. Solving the equation,
α =
pjλd− rl
pj(λd− rl) .
2. Weak player i’s expected payoff: At each point in time, including the beginning of the
game, weak player i expects to receive l if the game continues, that is, if neither player
concedes in the period. Therefore, in the limit as ∆ tends to zero,
rl =
gj(t)
1−Gj(t)d.
11
11The discrete-time analogue to this equation is
l = e−r∆
(
(1− e−λ∆)l + e−λ∆G(t+ ∆)−G(t)
1−G(t) h+ e
−λ∆ 1−G(t+ ∆)
1−G(t) l
)
.
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If weak player i does not concede, uninformed player j may concede, at an arrival rate
of
gj(t)
1−Gj(t) . Unlike the previous cases, the arrival of a public signal does not contribute
to the marginal benefit, because weak player i definitely loses in that event. Solving
this equation,
Gj(t) = 1− exp
(
−rl
d
t
)
.
Notice that Gj(0) = 0, because if Gj(0) > 0, then weak player i would strictly prefer
waiting an instant to conceding at the beginning of the game.
In this game, uninformed player j obtains
l + pjαd = l +
pjλd− rl
λd− rl d.
The value of the information-acquisition opportunity to the uninformed player is the differ-
ence between his payoff in Proposition 3 and this payoff, which amounts to(
l +
pjd− c
d− c d
)
−
(
l +
pjλd− rl
λd− rl d
)
=
(1− pj)d(rl − λc)
(d− c)(λd− rl) d.
Under Assumption 2, this value is always positive. This result shows that the option to
acquire information is indeed valuable to the uninformed player.
Weak informed player i again obtains l, while strong informed player i’s expected payoff
is ∫ ∞
0
e−rthd
(
1− e−λt(1−Gj(t))
)
=
λ+ rl
d
r + λ+ rl
d
h.
The latter payoff is strictly smaller than the corresponding payoff, h, in Proposition 3. This
result is somewhat surprising because the opponent (uninformed player j) is in a stronger
position and receives a higher payoff when he can acquire information. The driving force
for this result is that the role of the uninformed player’s information acquisition is mainly
to reduce unnecessary delay, which applies to the informed player as well as the uninformed
player.
If the game moves to the next period, a public signal arrives with probability 1− e−λ∆, in which case weak
player i receives l. Weak player i does not concede, unless it is the first period. He receives h if uninformed
player j concedes. Otherwise, his contiuation payoff is equal to l. Note that weak player i strictly prefers
waiting to conceding, because his expected payoff by waiting G(t+∆)−G(t)1−G(t) h+
1−G(t+∆)
1−G(t) l is strictly larger than
l.
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5.2 The (original) game in which both players are uninformed
Now we consider the original game in which both players start out being uninformed about
the state.
As with verifiable information, the game ends endogenously only when at least one player
acquires information. This is because of Assumption 2 and Proposition 3: if player i never
acquires information, then player j strictly prefers acquiring information to waiting because
his expected payoff by acquiring information −c + l + pid (Proposition 3) is strictly larger
than his expected payoff by not acquiring information (Assumption 2).
In addition, players prefer for the opponent to acquire information first. Although an
informed player receives information rents, the cost of information acquisition always out-
weighs information rents:
c− (1− pi)cd
d− c =
pid− c
d− c c > 0.
Intuitively, player i obtains l+pid if he is informed about the state, while his expected payoff
when he is uninformed is bounded below by −c + l + pid. Therefore, the information rent
cannot be larger than the information acquisition cost c.
The two results imply that the game is again a war of attrition regarding who acquires
information first. The difference from the verifiable case is in the players’ payoffs after one
of the players acquires information. The informed player obtains the same payoff as in the
verifiable case, but the opponent receives a strictly lower payoff. The latter occurs because
in equilibrium the uninformed player also acquires information with a positive probability.
For a direct comparison, let us use the same notations for the players’ information-
acquisition strategies as in the verifiable case. As usual, if t is in the interior of the support
of Fi, then player i must be indifferent between acquiring information and delaying it for an
instant. Therefore,
r (−c+ l + pid) =
(
λ+
fj(t)
1− Fj(t)
pid− c
d− c
)
c. (3)
The left-hand side is player i’s marginal cost of acquiring information an instant later,
while the right-hand side is the corresponding marginal benefit. If player i does not acquire
information right now, then a public signal may arrive, at an arrival rate of λ, or the opponent
may acquire information, at an arrival rate of
fj(t)
1−Fj(t) . In the latter case, player i avoids the
information-acquisition cost c but loses information rents, (1−pi)d
d−c c.
The solution to this first-order ordinary differential equation is
Fj(t) = 1− (1− Fj(0)) exp
(
− d− c
pid− c
(
r
−c+ l + pid
c
− λ
)
t
)
.
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Again, as usual, F1(0) and F2(0) can take any values in [0, 1] as long as at least one of them
is equal to zero. Therefore, there is a continuum of equilibria.
Proposition 4 When acquired information is not verifiable, there is a continuum of equi-
libria: for each F1(0), F2(0) ∈ [0, 1] such that F1(0)F2(0) = 0, there is an equilibrium in
which player i acquires information according to the distribution function Fi(t) = 1 − (1 −
Fi(0)) exp
(
− d−c
pjd−c
(
r
−c+l+pjd
c
− λ
)
t
)
for both i = 1, 2. The set of players’ payoffs is given
by{
(v1, v2) : vi ∈
[
−c+ l + pid, l + pjd− c
d− c d
]
, and (v1 − (−c+ l + p1d))(v2 − (−c+ l + p2d)) = 0
}
,
that is, player i can achieve any payoff in
[
−c+ l + pid, l + pjd−cd−c d
]
, as long as the opponent
receives −c+ l + pjd.
6 The Role of Information Verifiability
1u
2u
dpl 2
dpl 1dplc 1
dplc 2
d
cd
cdpl 
 1
d
cd
cdpl 
 2
)( 1dplr
 

)( 2dplr
 

Verifiable Info
Unverifiable Info
No Info
Figure 1: The sets of equilibrium payoffs
As shown in Figure 1, some payoff vectors are attainable only in the verifiable case. They
are obtained in the equilibria in which a player acquires information with a sufficiently high
probability at the beginning of the game and, thus, the delay in information acquisition is
rather small. The payoff difference stems from the difference in equilibrium behavior after
one player acquires information. In the verifiable case, the game concludes immediately
18
without any further distortions. The game also terminates immediately in the unverifiable
case. However, in equilibrium, the uninformed player acquires information with a positive
probability and, therefore, obtains a strictly smaller payoff than in the verifiable case.
To facilitate the comparison, we focus on the equilibria in which no player acquires
information with a positive probability at the beginning of the game. There are at least
four reasons why such equilibria are more appealing than others. First, in the symmetric
case, it is the unique symmetric equilibrium. Second, the war-of-attrition literature has
focused on the same class of equilibria and, thus, we can directly place our results in the
literature. Third, they are the only equilibria that do not require coordination between the
players regarding who moves first.12 Last, players want the opponent to acquire information
first. Therefore, if both players think that the opponent would acquire information at the
beginning of the game with some probability, then such equilibria will be uniquely selected.
In such equilibria, players obtain the same payoffs regardless of whether the information
is verifiable. Their payoffs coincide with the lower bounds of the payoff ranges. There are,
however, two important differences.
First, the lower bounds are essentially exogenously given in the verifiable case, while
they are endogenously determined in the unverifiable case. In the former case, acquired
information is public, and the lower bounds are simply derived from the public nature of the
information. They are the lower bounds even if we consider all the possible strategies of the
players, not just the equilibrium ones. In the latter case, there is no a priori reason for the
game to end immediately after a player acquires information. It is only in equilibrium that
the game concludes immediately, because in equilibrium the uninformed player also acquires
information immediately after.
1 2 3 4 5 6
t
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Probability
No information 
acquisition
Unverifiable
Verifiable
Figure 2: The cumulative probabilities that the game ends by time t.
Second, although the equilibrium strategies exhibit similar qualitative properties, they
are quantitatively different. In particular, the game ends faster with unverifiable information.
This comparison is in fact valid for any equilibria that share the same initial probabilities,
12See, for example, Levin and Smith (1994) and Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) for the uses of the same
restriction with the same motivation in different contexts.
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F1(0) and F2(0). See Figure 2 for a graphical representation of how quickly the game ends
for the case where F1(0) = F2(0) = 0.
Proposition 5 Fix F1(0) and F2(0) and let SV (t) and SU(t) be the corresponding cumulative
probabilities that the game ends by time t in the verifiable case and in the unverifiable case,
respectively. Then, SV first-order stochastically dominates SU .
Proof. From the characterization in Section 4,
SV (t) = 1− e−λt
2∏
i=1
(1− Fi(t))
= 1− e−λt
2∏
i=1
(1− Fi(0)) exp
(
−
(
r
−c+ l + pjd
c
− λ
)
t
)
Similarly,
SU(t) = 1− e−λt
2∏
i=1
(1− Fi(0)) exp
(
− d− c
pjd− c
(
r
−c+ l + pjd
c
− λ
)
t
)
.
Since d−c
pjd−c > 1, SV (t) < SU(t) for any t > 0.
This result provides an economic explanation for the payoff equivalence between the two
cases in the equilibria with F1(0) = F2(0) = 0. As explained at the beginning of this section,
duplication in information acquisition occurs only with unverifiable information. However,
there is less delay with unverifiable information. The gain due to less delay and the loss
due to duplication exactly cancel each other out and, thus, players obtain the same payoffs
regardless of whether information is verifiable.
7 Shorter Deadline, Longer Conflict
This section reports a comparative statics result regarding the arrival rate of public signals,
λ.13 When λ increases (the deadline arrives faster), there are two opposing effects. On
the one hand, the increase directly speeds up the resolution of the conflict by itself. On
the other hand, it indirectly crowds out the players’ incentive to acquire information. The
following proposition shows that the latter, indirect effect outweighs the former, direct effect,
regardless of whether information is verifiable and, thus, the game lasts longer as λ increases.
13Other comparative statics results are rather straightforward. The game last longer when r is smaller, c
is larger, or d is larger.
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Proposition 6 For any equilibrium, the probabilities that the game ends by time t in each
case, SV (t) and SU(t), strictly decrease in λ.
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 5,
SV (t) = 1− eλt
2∏
i=1
(1− Fi(0)) exp
(
−r−c+ l + pjd
c
t
)
,
and
SU(t) = 1− e
(
d−c
p1d−c+
d−c
p2d−c−1
)
λt
2∏
i=1
(1− Fi(0)) exp
(
− d− c
pjd− cr
−c+ l + pjd
c
t
)
.
As λ increases, the marginal benefit of delaying information acquisition increases and,
thus, both players are less likely to concede. The decrease of one player’s concession rate
decreases the other player’s marginal benefit. In equilibrium, each player decreases his
concession rate by at least as much as the increase in λ, so that the opponent is again
indifferent between acquiring information and waiting. This indirect effect applies to both
players and, therefore, is at least twice as large as the direct effect.
It is interesting that the indirect effect is larger when the information is unverifiable.
This is because a player’s gain when the opponent acquires information is smaller when the
information is unverifiable (see Equations (1) and (3)). With verifiable information, a player
avoids the information acquisition cost c regardless of whether the game ends due to the
arrival of the deadline or due to the opponent’s acquisition of information. Therefore, in
order to make the opponent remain indifferent, each player needs to reduce his concession
rate ( fi(t)
1−Fi(t)) by exactly as much as the increase in λ. With unverifiable information, due
to the information rents to the informed player, a player’s gain is strictly lower when the
game ends due to the opponent’s acquisition of information than due to the arrival of the
deadline. Therefore, each player must decrease his concession rate by strictly more than the
increase in λ.
8 Discussion
The model can be extended in several ways. We discuss two particularly interesting exten-
sions.
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8.1 Deterministic deadline and fighting cost
We explain below how our analysis carries over to the case involving a deterministic deadline
and fighting cost (no discounting).
8.1.1 Setup
We normalize the deadline to be at time t = 1. The payoff to each player is as follows: for
some k > 0,
Ui (ti, tj, ω) =
{
h− kti, if (ti > tj) or (ti = tj = 1 and ω = i),
l − kti, if (ti < tj) or (ti = tj = 1 and ω = j), or (ti = tj < 1).
In words, the winner receives h and the loser receives l. Players do not discount future
payoffs, but must keep paying a flow cost k > 0 to stay in the game. The rest of the
assumptions and notations are the same as in Sections 2 and 3.
The following two assumptions are analogous to Assumptions 1 and 2 in Section 3.
Assumption 3
k < pid, i = 1, 2.
Assumption 4
c < k.
Assumption 3 ensures that if no player acquires information, then both players wait until
the deadline. Assumption 4 guarantees that players have a non-trivial incentive to acquire
information.
8.1.2 Information acquisition with verifiable information
As in Section 4, the game is a war of attrition regarding who acquires information first. The
analogous equation to Equation (1) is
k =
fj(t)
1− Fj(t)c.
Now the marginal cost of delaying information acquisition is simply the flow fighting cost k.
Since the deadline is deterministic, the marginal benefit includes only the concession rate of
player j times the information-acquisition cost.
Using the equation, we can construct a continuum of equilibria, as in Section 4. The
following proposition is parallel to Proposition 2.
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Proposition 7 When acquired information is verifiable, there is a continuum of equilib-
ria: for any F1(0), F2(0) ∈ [0, 1] such that F1(0)F2(0) = 0, there is an equilibrium in
which each player acquires information according to a distribution function Fi(t) = 1 −
(1 − Fi(0))exp
(−k
c
t
)
over time [0, t], where t = 1 − c
k
, and simply waits until the deadline
after t. The set of equilibrium payoffs is given by
{(v1, v2) : vi ∈ [−c+ l + pid, l + pid], and (v1 − (−c+ l + p1d))(v2 − (−c+ l + p2d)) = 0} .
The only essential difference from Proposition 2 is the presence of t, which is the last
time players may acquire information in the equilibrium. Such t exists because when it is
sufficiently close to the deadline, players strictly prefer waiting until the deadline to incurring
the information-acquisition cost. t is the time at which players are indifferent between
ending the game immediately by acquiring information and waiting until the deadline, that
is, −c+ l + pid = −(1− t)k + l + pid.
8.1.3 Information acquisition with unverifiable information
Unless it is close to the deadline (precisely, before 1− c
k
), the subgame outcome where only
one player is informed is exactly the same as in Section 5. The weak informed player concedes
with probability 1− pic
pj(d−c) immediately. If the informed player does not concede, then the
uninformed player acquires information with probability 1, but he is indifferent between
acquiring information and conceding.
In the original game, the analogous condition to Equation (3) is
k =
fj(t)
1− Fj(t)
pid− c
d− c c.
The usual interpretations apply to each side. The following proposition corresponds to
Proposition 4.
Proposition 8 When acquired information is unverifiable, there is a continuum of equi-
libria: for any F1(0), F2(0) ∈ [0, 1] such that F1(0)F2(0) = 0, it is an equilibrium that
each player acquires information according to a distribution function Fi(t) = 1 − (1 −
Fi(0))exp
(
−k
c
d−c
pid−ct
)
over time [0, t], where t = 1 − c
k
, and simply waits until the dead-
line after t. The set of equilibrium payoffs is given by{
(v1, v2) : vi ∈ [−c+ l + pid, l + pid− c
d− c d], and (v1 − (−c+ l + p1d))(v2 − (−c+ l + p2d)) = 0
}
.
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8.2 Unobservable information acquisition
We assumed that if a player acquires information, then the opponent knows that the player
is informed about the state, regardless of whether information is verifiable. The assumption
is innocuous for the verifiable-information case, but not for the unverifiable-information case.
Suppose the information is verifiable, but a player’s information acquisition is not ob-
servable by the opponent. Pick any equilibrium in Proposition 2 and consider the following
strategy profile: each player acquires information according to Fi and discloses the acquired
information regardless of its content (or, he simply concedes if the state is unfavorable to
him). In this strategy profile, the only potential incentive problem is whether a weak player
would be willing to concede immediately. But given that the opponent would concede only
when he himself finds out that the state is unfavorable to him, a weak player strictly prefers
conceding immediately. Therefore, any equilibrium outcome in Proposition 2 can be sup-
ported as an equilibrium outcome even when information acquisition is not observable.
When information is not verifiable, no equilibrium outcome in Proposition 4 can be
supported as an equilibrium outcome with unobservable information acquisition. This is
because the subgame outcome after one player’s acquisition of information dramatically
changes, since, by definition, the opponent does not know that the other player is informed.
It is not obvious whether the players would acquire information faster (and whether the game
would last longer). A players would have a weaker direct incentive to acquire information,
because even if he knows that the state was favorable to him, he would have to bear some
delay costs. On the other hand, the fact that the opponent would acquire information more
slowly implies that players would have a lower marginal benefit from delaying information
acquisition and, thus, players would have a stronger indirect incentive to acquire information.
We expect that if the information is unverifiable, then the players’ expected payoffs
would be lower when information acquisition is not observable14 and a typical equilibrium
would consist of two regimes: first, players would gradually acquire information and, second,
once uninformed players become sufficiently pessimistic, they would play a standard war of
attrition with incomplete information. This case is theoretically interesting. Not only does
the symmetric-information game turn into a game with asymmetric information at some
point, but also the players face a complicated inference problem. They must constantly
update their beliefs about the opponent’s status (whether he has acquired information and,
if so, whether he received a favorable information) as well as infer what beliefs the opponent
14We know that this is true for c rather large. Precisely, if (and only if) c ≥ rr+λp1l (this inequality does
not violate Assumption 2), then there is an equilibrium in which no player acquires information: player i’s
equilibrium payoff is λr+λ (pih+ (1− pi)l), which is larger than his deviation payoff by acquiring information
−c+ pi λr+λh+ (1− pi)l whenever c ≥ rr+λpil.
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would have about his beliefs in each status. We leave this challenging problem for future
research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3:
(1) Weak player i obtains only l.
Suppose not. It can happen only when player j concedes without acquiring information
with a certain probability. Therefore, player j’s expected payoff must be equal to l. But
since weak player i would not quit immediately, player j’s belief over the true state would
not change, which implies that player j can secure −c + l + pjd by acquiring information.
By Assumptions 1 and 2, the latter payoff is strictly larger than the former and, thus, this
is a contradiction.
(2) At the beginning of the subgame, weak player i randomizes between conceding and
waiting.
The argument given before the proposition applies.
(3) Let α be the probability that weak player i concedes at the beginning of the subgame.
An instant later, player j must be indifferent between acquiring information and conceding
without acquiring information. Therefore,
α =
pjd− c
pj(d− c) .
Suppose player j strictly prefers acquiring information to conceding. Then weak player
i obtains only l, regardless of whether player j acquires information or waits for a public
signal. But then an instant before (at the beginning of the subgame), weak player i strictly
prefers conceding to waiting, which contradicts (2). Now suppose player j strictly prefers
conceding to acquiring information. For this and (2) to be simultaneously true, both weak
player i and player j must be indifferent between conceding and waiting for a public signal.
This implies that, again, weak player i obtains only l, which creates the same contradiction
as the previous case.
(4) An instant after the beginning of the subgame, player j either acquires information
or concedes. That is, player j does not simply wait for a public signal.
Suppose player j strictly prefers waiting to conceding. For (2) to be true, weak player
i must strictly prefer waiting to conceding as well (otherwise, weak player i must prefer
conceding earlier). The latter implies that player j’s belief does not change at the next
instant and, thus, he again strictly prefers waiting to conceding or acquiring information. In
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addition, by the same argument as above, weak player i does not concede. This process will
continue until a public signal arrives. But weak player i’s expected payoff is then strictly
smaller than l, which contradicts (4).
Now suppose player j is indifferent among waiting, conceding, and acquiring information
and he waits with a positive probability. Similarly to the previous case, weak player i must
strictly prefer waiting to conceding. He also must strictly prefer waiting to conceding at
the next instant as well, because otherwise, at the following instant, player j’s belief would
decrease, player j would concede immediately, and then weak player i would obtain strictly
more than l, which would contradict (2). This process will continue until player j acquires
information, player j concedes, or a public signal arrives. Suppose player j waits for a signal
forever. Since weak player i never concedes, player j’s expected payoff is
λ
r + λ
(
l +
pj(1− α)
pi + pj(1− α)d
)
=
λ
r + λ
(l + c) .
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, this payoff is strictly smaller than l, which contradicts the fact
that player j is indifferent between waiting and conceding.
(5) Player j acquires information with probability 1, that is, player j concedes with
negligible probability.
Otherwise, then weak player i would strictly prefer waiting an instant to conceding imme-
diately, which would contradict (2). As shown in the main content, in discrete time, player
j concedes with a positive probability, but the probability approaches zero as ∆ tends to
zero. Q.E.D.
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